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Private Browsing: A Window of Forensic Opportunity
Howard Chivers
Department of Computer Science, The University of York, Heslington, York, YO10 5GH, UK
Abstract
The release of Internet Explorer 10 marks a significant change in how browsing artifacts are stored in the Windows file system,
moving away from well-understood Index.dat files to use a high performance database, the Extensible Storage Engine. Researchers
have suggested that despite this change there remain forensic opportunities to recover InPrivate browsing records from the new
browser. The prospect of recovering such evidence, together with its potential forensic significance, prompts questions including
where and when such evidence can be recovered, and if it is possible to prove that a recovered artefact originated from InPrivate
browsing. This paper reports the results of experiments which answer these questions, and also provides some explanation of
the increasingly complex data structures used to record Internet activity from both the desktop and Windows 8 Applications. We
conclude that there is a time window between the private browsing session and the next use of the browser in which browsing
records may be carved from database log files, after which it is necessary to carve from other areas of disk. It proved possible to
recover a substantial record of a user’s InPrivate browsing, and to reliably associate such records with InPrivate browsing.
Keywords: Digital Forensics, Internet Explorer, Microsoft Windows, Database, Carving
1. Introduction
The release of Internet Explorer 101 marked a significant
change in how Internet history and cache data are stored within
the file system; the binary historical formats which have been
widely documented in the forensic community (e.g. (Jones,
2003) ) were replaced by a high performance database tech-
nology known as the Extensible Storage Engine (ESE). This
database is used to support a range of other applications, includ-
ing Windows Search, and was the subject of a previous paper
in which we described the results of carving for deleted ESE
database records from the Search Database (Chivers and Har-
greaves, 2011). The carving tool is now known as ESECarve 2
and has subsequently been used to assist a number of real in-
vestigations.
InPrivate Browsing is an Internet Explorer mode which is
launched by the user in a separate browsing window; the
claim is that this mode “prevents local storage on your com-
puter”(Microsoft, 2012). The prospect of evidential recovery
from private browsing is of considerable forensic interest, and
several researchers have reported using string searches to iden-
tify artifacts of interest; others have used ESECarve to survey
residual browsing histories and suggest that such evidence is
recoverable (Malmstro¨m and Teveldal, 2013).
Email address: hrchivers@iee.org (Howard Chivers)
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The prospect of recovering evidence from InPrivate brows-
ing prompts questions, including when such evidence can be
recovered, the implications for seizure tactics, where the evi-
dence can be found, and if it is possible to prove that a recov-
ered artefact originated with InPrivate, as opposed to normal,
browsing. This paper reports the results of experiments which
answer these questions, and also provides some explanation of
the increasingly complex data structures used to record Internet
activity from the desktop and by Windows 8 Metro Applica-
tions. Results of forensic interest include:
• InPrivate browsing artifacts can be positively identified us-
ing the Type field in cache content records.
• Pull-the-plug seizure may allow the recovery of In-
Private browsing records from the database file (Web-
CacheV01.dat); however, it may also result in a database
that cannot be recovered for use with application interface-
based tools because log files have not been completely
written to disk.
• The window of opportunity for the recovery of InPrivate
artifacts from database log files extends to the next time
the browser is opened for use. During this window sub-
stantial recovery is possible, afterwards these data are se-
curely deleted.
• Browsing evidence may also be recovered from areas of
disk apart from normal database files and logs; this may
persist for some time.
• The table structure within the database includes separate
records for applications, allowing some fine grain distinc-
tions to be made about the use of the computer.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion 2 briefly describes the Extensible Storage Engine and Data
Storage in HTTP/HTML, both of which are needed to under-
stand the descriptions of database behaviour and browser arti-
facts that follow; this is followed by a review of publications
related to private browsing. Section 3 describes how the exper-
iments used to determine browser behaviour were conducted.
The next sections present detailed results; section 4 describes
the files that support Internet Explorer and how the database ta-
bles are structured, section 5 describes the conclusions of exper-
iments to determine if InPrivate browsing records can be recov-
ered. Findings are further discussed at section 6 and the paper is
concluded in section 7. Appendixes describe the restoration of
a database to a clean state, and record carving using ESECarve.
Terminology. This paper uses the term ’record’ to mean a
single database record or row. Browsing records include a URL
with an associated date and time. They document a single In-
ternet action; examples include a cached response to a HTTP
request, a download, a history record of a visit to a domain, or
the storage of a cookie. The term ’browsing record’ here should
not be taken as an implication that it originated from human ac-
tion.
2. Background
2.1. Extensible Storage Engine (ESE)
The Extensible Storage Engine is documented on-line by Mi-
crosoft (Microsoft, 2013), and details of its internal structure
have been published by Joachim Metz (Metz, 2010). A previ-
ous paper (Chivers and Hargreaves, 2011) provides an overview
of the database and the reliability of records recovered by carv-
ing. This section briefly describes transaction processing, as a
background to why database records are often found in log files
or in cached memory such as the pagefile.
The Extensible Storage Engine is designed to process high
transaction volumes and be recoverable from failures, such as
a system crash while data are being written to disk. A typical
transaction sequence is shown in figure 1, with the file names
currently used by Internet Explorer 10.
An incoming transaction is first held in a memory log cache
(1), then any necessary database pages are brought into mem-
ory (2) and the transaction applied (3); as soon as possible the
updated database record is written to the log file (4). Eventu-
ally the database file is updated with the page which contains
the new transaction. A database whose file has not been fully
updated is known as dirty. On a normal shutdown the log cache
is flushed to disk, whereas the database file (WebCacheV01.dat)
may not necessarily be updated and may be left in a dirty state.
If the database is dirty it must first be recovered (in ESE ter-
minology), before it can be accessed using the database ap-
plication interface. This process recovers the database to a
consistent state by replaying log transactions from a known
checkpoint. The checkpoint is stored in a V01.chk file and
the logs are recorded in files numbered in a hexadecimal se-
quence (e.g.V010009.log, V010000A.log) together with the cur-
rent working log (V01.log). When the current working log
Figure 1: The Propagation of Transaction Data into Disk Files.Transactions are
cached in memory and written quickly to log files; the database file is subse-
quently updated from memory or recovered from the logs.
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is full it is renamed to the next name in the hexadecimal se-
quence, and a new V01.log file is created. Logs that are no
longer needed are deleted.
Both database and log records use the same record format, so
records from either can be recovered by carving.
It is evident from this process that database records are found
in memory and perhaps therefore in the pagefile, in log files,
and in the database file. The action of allocating and freeing
files for logs may also leave records in unallocated or slack
space in the file system. Because this is a high performance
database there are deeper layers of caching and lazy writing
which may delay the writing or deletion of records.
Some forensic tools require the database to be recovered to a
clean state before it can be processed via the database applica-
tion interface; the esentutl utility can be used for this purpose,
and for investigating the table structure of an unknown ESE
database. This is described in section Appendix A. Forensic
practitioners should also note that:
• Some forensic tools automatically recover the database to
a clean state before retrieving records via the application
interface; they require the .chk, and .log files as well as the
database file.
• The recovery process will delete as well as add database
records; it is often more productive to carve from a dirty
database rather than a recovered copy.
• Pull-the-plug seizure may result in an unrecoverable
database because logs files have not been flushed to disk
from database caches. This occurred in approximately
40% of the experiments reported here.
2.2. HTTP/HTML Data Storage
Certain data types originating from HTTP protocol trans-
actions or from scripted actions in HTML pages are stored
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separately in the file system and result in distinctive database
records: cookies, Web Storage and Indexed Database storage.
Cookies are a well known mechanism for maintaining state
between HTTP protocol exchanges, for example to allow a web
server to identify a request with a previous transaction (Barth,
2011). Cookies are name:value pairs which are returned in
HTTP requests to the domain which supplied them. The value
is a short text string, which is often a key to information held at
the server, such as a user’s session information.
The other two data types are managed by scripts running on
web pages . WebStorage (W3C, 2013b), known as DOMStor-
age by Microsoft allows the storage of name:value data on the
client. It is more flexible than the cookie mechanism in the as-
signment of access rights, lifetime, and size, allowing the stor-
age of data objects of up to 10MByte. DOMStorage may be
used for client-side storage, such as cached mailboxes or other
files, as well as for session continuity. From the forensic arte-
fact perspective DOMStorage can be thought of as a separately
managed data cache, the difference being that DOMStorage is
managed by scripts on web pages, unlike cache content which
is managed by the browser.
The third type of data storage is the Indexed Database API
(W3C, 2013a), also known as IndexedDB. This provides web
pages with the ability to store large arbitrary objects which
are flexibly indexed; for example, keywords may be associated
with documents and allow the retrieval of a set of documents by
specifying a key. This more flexible storage allows the caching
of complex objects such as scenes from online games, and also
allows them to be viewed oﬄine. This is a relatively new fea-
ture which is part of HTML5 and has yet to achieve widespread
use. This storage will not be discussed further in this paper,
since it stored in a separate database, Internet.edb3
2.3. Protected Integrity Levels and Application Containers
Browsing records are separated into different database tables
by data type (e.g. cookie, DOMStorage, URL cache, download,
cached page content) and also by integrity category. Earlier ver-
sions of Internet Explorer divided data into two integrity cate-
gories, one for sites accessed in protected mode (Internet and
Restricted network zones), and the other for data loaded from
Trusted Sites, the Local Intranet or the Local Machine. This
separation is maintained in Internet Explorer 10; however, the
Metro Applications introduced in Windows 8 execute in sepa-
rate AppContainers, each of which is a separate integrity parti-
tion. This separation can be confusing for a user; for example
the desktop Internet Explorer and will not share cookies with
the same browser launched as a Metro Application.
For the forensic practitioner the distinction between integrity
containers may add information about the user’s behaviour, and
is needed to understand the large number of Internet caches in
the file system.
3The Internet.edb database is usually located at: \Users\%USERPROFILE
%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Indexed DB. A demonstration
of pictures that use Indexed Data can be seen at http:\\snapyx.azurewebsites.net
- note the large difference in time to load the images between the first and
subsequent visits.
2.4. Related Work
Some general studies have been carried out on private brows-
ing. Aggarwal et al. (2010) provide a thoughtful analysis of
threat models and what constitutes private browsing and sur-
vey four different browsers. They find weaknesses in all but do
not report the possibility of data retention in Internet Explorer
8. In contrast Ohana and Shashidhar (2013), also working with
Internet Explorer 8 and other browsers identified recoverable
evidence in unallocated and slack space. Similar results were
obtained by Said et al. (2011) who noted evidence on disk and
in physical memory for InPrivate browsing in Internet Explorer
8.
Mahendrakar et al. (2010) review artifacts in memory and
ways they can be obfuscated or recovered; they suggest a tool
to reassemble files from memory blocks. The approach taken
here is not to attempt reassembly of database files, but to re-
liably carve individual records. (Satvat et al., 2013) is a more
recent paper, but despite quoting Internet Explorer 10 as the
target, they describe the analysis of Index.dat files which are
associated with earlier versions of the browser. The paper pro-
vides interesting suggestions for active attacks; however, these
are less relevant to the normal forensic process.
Malmstro¨m and Teveldal (2013) experimented with Internet
Explorer 10 and suggest that residual evidence may be recov-
erable following InPrivate browsing; they also document some
aspects of the Containers table. This work concludes that the
positive identification of InPrivate browsing records is still an
open question, and prompts further questions about the extent
and reliability of the recovery of such records.
3. Method
The results reported here were obtained using Windows 8
Pro and Internet Explorer Version 10.0.9200.16384. The op-
erating system was run within a VMWare virtual machine, al-
lowing a complete reset of the system state when necessary.
To simulate a ’pull the plug’ seizure the virtual machine was
paused while the browser was still open and an image taken of
the resulting system. Each stage in each experiment was im-
aged using FTK Imager into an E01 image file for future study.
Recovery of database metadata, current database contents, and
carving were carried out using ESECarve V1.19, selection and
counting of results were carried out using scripted regular ex-
pressions in Python, and file system mapping was carried out in
XWays Forensics V17.3.
Memory images were not captured, since they are unfortu-
nately rarely available to forensic analysts; however, the find-
ings here on pagefile provide a good indication of the potential
benefit of a memory image if one were available.
The database schema (metadata) was first extracted and a se-
ries of scoping experiments carried out to confirm how ESE
data fields are used by Internet Explorer. This allowed confir-
mation of important factors such as the interpretation of date
and time information; the results are summarized in section 4
below.
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Each browsing experiment was conducted over 5 days in
which the remanence of artifacts resulting from InPrivate brows-
ing on the first day were measured under different conditions of
system use. The measurement process was to carve all available
database records from the disk image for the day; records of in-
terest were identified and the offsets provided by the carver then
mapped to the file system producing a complete map of artifacts
of interest. The InPrivate browsing activity was designed to
produce an image-rich data set with sufficient images to allow
indicative statistics to be obtained. www.carandclassic.co.uk
provides lists of classic cars for sale with small pictures, and
sufficient pages were visited to guarantee that each browsing
session had cached over 500 images.
Only recoverable database records were counted as results,
in contrast with the alternative of searching the image for dis-
tinctive URLs. As would be expected, the URL search would
identify a few extra artifacts where the URL was available but
the surrounding record was corrupt. In these tests the difference
is small (around 7%). In real cases it has proved necessary to re-
cover the contextual information provided by the whole record,
not just a URL fragment. This methodology is therefore closer
to the needs of forensic practice than string search counting.
Three InPrivate experiments were carried out: a scoping ex-
ercise, a controlled comparison with ample system memory,
and finally a mixed-load scenario.
The scoping exercise was used to confirm the likelihood that
artifacts would be found. Because it appeared that InPrivate
records were added to the database normally, and then deleted,
it seemed likely that there was a marker value within each record
which either indicated deletion or InPrivate browsing. This was
identified and then confirmed by reference to Microsoft docu-
mentation. The first experiment also suggested that the avail-
ability of records in the database and log files would persist
only to the next use of the browser, although records could still
be found on other parts of the disk.
The second experiment was designed to confirm that InPri-
vate browsing records could be uniquely identified, and the
point at which data were deleted from database files. Three
separate machines were used: Use, Avoid, and Control. InPri-
vate browsing was carried out on the first two, after which the
Use machine was subject to daily light browsing, and the Avoid
machine was subject to daily use without opening the browser.
The Control machine was subject to the same use, but the ini-
tial session was carried out using normal, as opposed to InPri-
vate, browsing. These experiments were carried out with am-
ple memory (1 GByte) allocated to each virtual machine; since
the browsed images were small in size and there was negligi-
ble background machine load it was expected that the browser
would be unlikely to page memory.
The results of this experiment confirmed expectations: com-
parison of the Avoid and Use machines resulted in InPrivate
artifacts being deleted on the first use of the browser in the Use
machine, but not during the experiment in the Avoid machine.
Comparison of the artifacts recovered from the Use machine
and the Control machine was unable to find any instance which
contradicted the field value which marked InPrivate browsing.
Also as anticipated, no artifacts were discovered on disk outside
Figure 2: Overview of Cache Data Structures.The Containers table acts as an
index into a series of Container nn tables and specifies the directory path to the
related cache directory; individual records in the Container nn table specify the
cached filename.
Containers
...
ContainerId ...  Directory
...
Container_nn
...
... URL ...  Filename
...
WebCacheV01.dat
Cache
the browser files.
The third experiment was designed to simulate a computer
with a heavier workload; a virtual machine was created with
500GByte of memory, and while the test InPrivate browsing
session was conducted a video was watched using the Firefox
browser. The disk map of this experiment is reported in de-
tail below; the results were consistent with those previously
achieved and resulted in a large number of long-lived recov-
erable browsing records outside the database and log files.
4. Browser Data structures
4.1. Overview
Internet Explorer 10 maintains a single database which in-
cludes history records and indexes to various caches, the database
file WebCacheV01.dat is located at:
\Users\%USERPROFILE%\AppData\Local\Microsoft
\Windows\WebCache
This location appears to be standard, we have not identified
a registry stetting or group policy that allows it to be changed.
The same directory includes associated database files, V01.chk,
V01.log, and V01nnnn.log, where nnnn is a hexadecimal se-
quence number.
The relationship between the most important database tables
is shown in figure 2.
The WebCacheV01.dat database contains a Containers table,
and records in that table act as an index to actual data containers
which are tables with names of the form Container nn. The
presence of a record in the Containers table does not guarantee
that there is a corresponding Container nn table, although they
are usually present.
Index records in the Containers table specify the directory
which contains the actual data items (e.g. cookies, cache), the
names of these files are specified in the browsing records in the
associated Container nn table.
The Containers table therefore acts as a master index, its
fields include:
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Figure 3: Secure Directories.Files are placed in subdirectories of the path identified in the Containers table.
Table: Containers
ContainerId
Name
PartitionId
Directory
SecureDirectories
SecureUsage
Field Value
13
Content
L
C:\Users\IE10Test\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Low\Content.IE5\
YC3XD8A450OECQ8Y B1N8T3MQ
27 00 00 00 26 00 00 00 27 00 00 00
Y6SNPOZU
27 00 00 00
Table: Container_13
ContainerId
SecureDirectory
Filename
Field Value
13
3
gpt[1].js
The SecureDirectory field in the container record
specifies the 3rd 8-character random name which
is the sub-directory in which the file is stored. The
usage string specifies the number of entries in the
directory; here 0x00000027 = 39.
• ContainerId: which is the number of the associated Con-
tainer nn table.
• Directory: in which cached or stored files are held.
• Name: which describes the type of data in the container
(e.g. cookie, content, history).
• PartitionId: which specifies the integrity partition: L -
Low, H - High, or a specific AppContainer).
Windows 8 systems may have large number of containers;
each Metro Application will usually have containers for both
cookies and cache content and the desktop Internet Explorer
will have similar containers at both M and L integrity levels.
Containers are also allocated to History records and other data
types. A typical Windows 8 laptop with only the standard Metro
Applications and little history is likely to have between 40 and
50 containers. Knowledge of these data structures is potentially
valuable to a forensic practitioner, since they each specify a di-
rectory with Internet records on disk.
Each record in a Container nn table includes the following
fields:
• ContainerId: which references the associated row in the
Container table.
• SecureDirectory: which is used to index a sub-directory
within the cache path.
• Type: which may be used to determine if the record origi-
nated with InPrivate Browsing.
• AccessCount: the number of times a URL has been refer-
enced (but not necessarily selected by the user).
• Date and Time Information: fields include Sync, Creation,
Expiry, Modified, and Accessed times.
• URL: the URL from which the information was obtained,
in some instances a response header is also available.
• Filename: the name of the cache file used to store the data
item.
These fields are included because they are likely to be of
forensic significance; they are discussed in detail in the sec-
tions below. Other fields have not been diagnosed or confirmed
by experiment.
4.2. Secure Directories
Content cache items and certain other types (e.g. DOMStore
data objects) are stored in sub-directories of the path specified
in the Containers table. These sub-directories are given random
8 character names, similar to cache storage in previous versions
of Internet Explorer. The mapping from the database record to
the sub-directory name is implemented as shown in figure 3.
The SecureDirectories string is a list of 8 character names, in-
dexed starting from 1; the SecureDirectories value in the record
specifies which of these sub-directories is used for that particu-
lar data item.
The usage record is stored as a long binary string, here shown
as a series of hexadecimal values; the values should be read
as a series of 4-byte little-endian numbers which indicate the
number of files in the corresponding directory. Experimentally
it was not always possible to confirm that these numbers were
exactly correct, they often differed by a small number from the
actual number of files, this is unexplained but may be a result
of cached writing.
One feature of the directories listed in the Containers ta-
ble (not the random named subdirectories) is that they usually
contain a container.dat file, of zero size. The consequence is
where there are records without associated files, such as His-
tory records, the directory listed in the Containers table contains
only the zero size container.dat file. This arrangement seems to
have little forensic value, other than the possibility that zero size
files of this type may indicate the presence of actual records in
a corresponding database table.
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Table 1: Examples of PartitionIds and related directories for Internet Explorer content entries in the Containers table. The text distinguishes between different
integrity partitions: Low, Medium, and those specific to an Application.
ContainerId PartitionId Directory
8 M C:\Users\IE10Test\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet
Files\Content.IE5\
7 S-1-15-2-1430448594-
2639229838-973813799-
439329657-1197984847-
4069167804-1277922394
C:\Users\IE10Test\AppData\Local\Packages\windows ie ac 001\AC
\INetCache\
13 L C:\Users\IE10Test\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet
Files\Low\Content.IE5\
4.3. PartitionId and AppContainer
Integrity levels and AppContainers were introduced in sec-
tion 2.3. For desktop applications the PartitionId in the Con-
tainers table is L (low integrity) corresponding to data written
in protected mode (Internet, or Restricted zones), or H (high
integrity) corresponding to data from the Local Machine, Lo-
cal Intranet, or Trusted domains. Note that some data, such as
daily history records, are written by the local machine outside
protected mode, despite originating from an Internet access.
For AppContainers the SID (Security Identifier) of the Appli-
cation is the PartitionId, and the associated directory is specific
to that application. The name for Internet Explorer when run
as an Application is windows ie ac 001, and this can be related
to the SID via the associated directory path, or by searching
for the SID in the Registry (under Classes), and retrieving the
associated DisplayName.
Table 1 provides an example of three Content records related
to Internet Explorer.
4.4. Date and Time Information
Each browsing record has a number of date and time stamps,
although not all will necessarily be set. The meaning of these
date-time groups is intuitive and follows previous practice. The
summary below has been confirmed by browsing with offset
machine times while monitoring network packets as well as the
resulting cache files.
All dates and times are recorded in UT (GMT); those derived
from the host computer use the same offsets as the file system.
The dates and times present in the Content tables have the fol-
lowing significance:
• SyncTime: is the most recent time the url content was syn-
chronized, either by downloading a data item to the cache,
or by comparing the update time of the on-line content to
that of the cached item. If the cached data item is updated
as a result of a synch, then the modify time in the file sys-
tem is the same as the sync time.
• CreationTime: is the time that the cached item is first cre-
ated; it is the same as the file system create time for the
corresponding file.
• ExpiryTime: is the time set in the protocol data unit by
the web server; it is intended to be the time after which the
cache must be refreshed. This date-time may be calculated
from a maximum age, or directly reflect an expiry time;
either or both may appear in the HTTP protocol header.
• ModifiedTime: is the modified time set in the protocol data
unit by the web server. It is intended to reflect when the
on-line data item was last updated. It is not related to file
update times in the cache.
• AccessTime: is the most recent time the user accessed the
cached item.
Records also include PostCheckTime and SyncCount fields.
No values for PostCheckTime were observed. Despite exper-
iments designed to ensure cache synch, which was confirmed
in the network trace and in SyncTime values, the sync count
did not reflect the activity. It’s purpose is undiagnosed. Note
that times are changed when history records are rewritten, as
described in the next section.
4.5. Data Name
The name field in the Containers table gives the purpose of
the associated container and its directory. Familiar names from
previous versions of Internet Explorer are Cookies, Content,
and History. Downloaded data are given their own container,
iedownload, as is web storage which is named DOMStore. This
list is certainly not exhaustive, three other types of named data
justify specific mention: MSHIST01yyyymmddyyyymmdd, iecom-
pat, and PrivacIE.
• The name used for history records is also familiar from
previous versions of Internet Explorer: MSHIST01 fol-
lowed by two dates in year-month-day format. The name
signifies the date range over which records have been col-
lected. For example MSHIST012013100220131003 con-
tains records between 2nd and 3rd of October, 2013. His-
tory records provide a summary of user activity, more de-
tail is found in the Content records that index the Internet
cache.
As with previous versions of Internet Explorer, daily his-
tory records are subsumed into weekly records: a new
Container nn table is created, records copied to that con-
tainer and the old history tables deleted, usually when the
browser is next opened. Unfortunately the new records
have modified URLs and timestamps. The URL field is
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prefixed with the to-from dates of the history container,
in the same format as the table name; when the record
is rewritten this is replaced by the new date range. The
SyncTime and AccessedTime are changed to the time the
browsing records were rewritten.
• iecompat records are a pre-configured list of Internet ad-
dresses where it may be necessary to use a compatibility
mode, that is for Internet Explorer to emulate an earlier
browser version. They are loaded when the database is
rebuilt, so may appear in memory or logs after a delete op-
eration. Apart from perhaps providing evidence that the
database has been rebuilt, which in any case is likely to be
evident, they appear to be of little forensic interest. These
records were filtered from these experiments to avoid over-
stating the number of recovered records.
• PrivacIE records are not related to InPrivate browsing.
They are used to record URLs to third party sites, for ex-
ample advertisers’ web pages that are referenced on web
pages visited by the user. This information is used in In-
Private filtering to limit indirect access to such sites (Wil-
son, 2012). Unfortunately it is not just the name that
may cause confusion between InPrivate Filtering and In-
Private browsing; the type indicator used to identify In-
Private browsing is also used for PrivacIE records, and
the forensic practitioner must be aware of the distinction
to avoid ascribing PrivacIE records to InPrivate browsing.
See section 5.1, below.
5. InPrivate Browsing
This section describes two important outcomes of the ex-
periments described in section 3: how to identify records, and
where and when such records may be found.
5.1. Identifying InPrivate Browsing Records
Because InPrivate browsing records were found to be stored
in the same tables as other content, and then later deleted, it
seemed likely that there was a marker in each record to iden-
tify if its origin was InPrivate browsing. Scoping experiments
identified the Type field as a likely candidate, and analysis re-
vealed that this field was a bitmask with some obvious fea-
tures: cookie records always had the 0x100000 bit set, and His-
tory records were similarly associated with 0x200000. The bit
correlated with InPrivate browsing is 0x20000. This provided
sufficient information to search Microsoft Developer informa-
tion; the specification of these bitmasks is divided between the
header files WinInet.h and Wininet.h in the Windows 8 SDK.
Field definitions that are likely to be of interest to forensic prac-
titioners are listed in table 2.
Further experiments were carried out to identify other cir-
cumstances where the PRIVACY MODE CACHE ENTRY bit
was set, and none were found for cache Content records. This
bit was set, however, in PrivacIE records, which are introduced
above. In this case the STICKY CACHE ENTRY bit was also
set, usually giving a type value of 0x20004.
Table 2: Decoding the Type Field. This table lists the bit assignments most
likely to be of forensic interest; a full list can be found in the Windows 8 SKD
headers WinInet.h and Wininet.h.
Description Value
NORMAL CACHE ENTRY 0x00000001
STICKY CACHE ENTRY 0x00000004
HTTP 1 1 CACHE ENTRY 0x00000040
STATIC CACHE ENTRY 0x00000080
DOWNLOAD CACHE ENTRY 0x00000400
REDIRECT CACHE ENTRY 0x00000800
PRIVACY MODE CACHE ENTRY 0x00020000
COOKIE CACHE ENTRY 0x00100000
URLHISTORY CACHE ENTRY 0x00200000
PENDING DELETE CACHE ENTRY 0x00400000
POST RESPONSE CACHE ENTRY 0x04000000
INSTALLED CACHE ENTRY 0x10000000
IDENTITY CACHE ENTRY 0x80000000
In conclusion, the agreement of Microsoft SDK documenta-
tion with experimental evidence provides confidence that Con-
tent records with the PRIVACY MODE CACHE ENTRY bit
set originated from InPrivate browsing. However, PrivacIE
records do not provide evidence of InPrivate browsing; where
the container cannot be reliably identified, records with the
STICKY CACHE ENTRY bit set should be regarded as Pri-
vacIE, and not InPrivate browsing.
5.2. The Lifecycle of InPrivate Browsing Artifacts
This section presents results of the third experiment described
in section 3. This was deliberately carried out in a mixed work
environment rather than a ’clean’ environment in which the
only activity was that under study. Memory was constrained
and competing processes were running at the same time as In-
Private browsing.
A full disk map for the results of this experiment is presented
in table 3. The map was created by carving the whole disk for
Internet Explorer 10 records using ESECarve, filtering those
records to extract only InPrivate browsing using the Type field
described above, then mapping the resulting records to files.
Each stage of the experiment was separately mapped, and the
table shows the how the number of records recovered and their
file system assignments changed as the experiment progressed.
The term unallocated is used for any space within the file
system which is not allocated to a file system object or file, this
is synonymous with free space used by some forensic tools.
The table is divided into two parts, the first set of records map
to database files, the second to other areas of the disk; they will
be described separately. The counts given in each section are
the number of InPrivate browsing Content records recovered.
5.2.1. Database Files
Database log records are first written to the current log file
(V01.log), and when this is full that file is renamed to the next
in the hexadecimal sequence (in this example V010000F.log)
and a new V01.log allocated. This process is evident in the disk
map.
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Table 3: Disk Map of Recovered InPrivate Browsing Records. InPrivate browsing Content records were carved from a disk image and mapped to file allocations.
The table shows how the availability and mapping of recovered records change with time.
1: Pull Plug 2: After Shutdown 3: After Use 24 Hours Later 4: After Use 48 Hours Later
Count Allocated To Count Allocated To Count Allocated To Count Allocated To
817 WebCacheV01.dat 0 Records overwritten with 0x4F
580 V010000D.log 0 Disk space reallocated, overwritten with 0x4F or new records
624 V010000E.log 624 unallocated 0 Contents overwritten with 0xFF
254 V01.log 260 V010000F.log 0 Reallocated to a new file and overwritten.
0 unallocated 23 V01.log 16 V0100010.log 0 unallocated, over-
written 0x4F
984 pagefile.sys 984 984 984
442 System Volume In-
formation
442 442 442
Total Carved Records: 3701 2333 1442 1426
Total Unique Records: 899 812 742 741
The database file, WebCacheV01.dat, is populated with In-
Private browsing records during the browsing process; these are
securely deleted (overwritten) when the browser is closed. No
records remained in this file after the browsing session.
Records do remain in the log files after the InPrivate ses-
sion. In general (see V010000E.log, V01.log/V010000F.log,
V01.log/V0100010.log) logs are removed when Internet Ex-
plorer is opened, not when it is closed. This is consistent with
the behavior that would be predicted for this database (see sec-
tion 2.1): while it is operation in-memory records and logs are
updated and the database file is marked as ’dirty’; before the
database can be re-opened for use it is updated from the logs
and logs that are no longer needed are deleted. In control ex-
periments in which the test machine was used but the browser
not opened the logs were not modified.
The evidence for how these logs are eventually deleted is
mixed, but it is clear that no InPrivate browsing records remain.
The common behavior observed for several files is for individ-
ual records to be overwritten by 0x4F, this is consistent with the
treatment of InPrivate records in the database file.
There is one anomaly in these results which is the treatment
of V010000D.log. This log file was deleted while the InPrivate
session was active, and it is eventually returned to unallocated
space and completely overwritten by 0xFF. The anomaly is that
it is released to unallocated space in column 2 (at the first shut-
down) but not overwritten until the system is next used. Re-
moving file allocation then subsequently overwriting it in free
space is a curious system behaviour, it was checked using a dif-
ferent forensic tool with the same result, to ensure that it was
not a feature of the mapping in XWays Forensics.
5.2.2. Other Disk Artifacts
InPrivate browsing records were found in large quantities in
two areas of disk unrelated to the database files. The first is
pagefile, which was expected given the process environment in
which the browsing was carried out.
The second area was within a large file in the System Vol-
ume Information directory. Comparison of the records found
in this directory with the database files captured in previous ex-
perimental steps suggest that this content originated from the
V010000D.log file.
5.2.3. Recovery Success
Because the same record may be found in several places there
will inevitably be duplicates. The total of unique records shown
in table 3 is the number of unique combinations of database
ID and URL recovered from all sources; this measure will not
count revisited URLs, however revisits were not a major fea-
ture of this experiment. Because of the comprehensive method
of capture, the 899 records captured when the machine was
stopped after browsing is likely to be a high proportion of the
total records generated while browsing.
There are three distinct sources of browsing records: the
database file, log files, and other areas on disk. In this experi-
ment most of the unique results could have been obtained from
any of the three sources; at the end of the experiment when no
records were available from database files 82% of the available
records were still recoverable. The disk map also provides a
clear indication of when various InPrivate browsing records are
available:
• From the database file: during browsing, or if the machine
has been powered off during browsing.
• From database log files: after the browsing session, and
before the browser is next opened.
• From other areas on disk: may persist for some time, de-
pending on system activity.
6. Discussion
The primary objectives of this research were to clarify under
what circumstances, and to what extent, it is possible to recover
InPrivate browsing records from Internet Explorer 10, and to
identify a marker that provides evidence that a recovered record
originated from InPrivate browsing.
Experimental results confirmed by Windows header files pro-
vide a clear marker for InPrivate browsing records: a Type field
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with bit 0x20000 set. This result is confirmed experimentally
for Content records, i.e. those that index the cache. PrivacIE
records, which are not necessarily related to InPrivate brows-
ing also set this bit. Usually confirmation of the data held in a
record requires the ContainerId to be checked in the Contain-
ers table; however this may not be possible if that table is not
recovered. There is also the usual problem of foreign key ref-
erences; using a key (i.e. ContainerId) to look up a value in
a second table requires evidence that they existed at the same
time, similar to the problem of determining what web content
a user actually viewed from an old URL. In this case, however,
evidence within a record will identify it as PrivacIE data: this
name is present in the URL field, and the Type is likely to have
the sticky cache bit set (0x4). There should therefore be no
possibility of confusing PrivacIE records with Content records
resulting from InPrivate browsing.
InPrivate browsing records were found in the database file,
WebCacheV01.dat, in related log files, and in other areas on the
disk:
WebCacheV01.dat held recoverable InPrivate records while
the browsing session was in force, or if the machine was de-
powered while the browsing session was still open; when the
browsing session closed these records were securely deleted.
Log files provided recoverable records between the closure
of the InPrivate browsing session and the next time that Internet
Explorer was opened. This was observed in all experiments,
and is consistent with the expected database behaviour: while
the database is in use in-memory records and logs are updated
and the database file is marked as ’dirty’; before the database
can be re-opened it is updated from the logs and logs that are
no longer needed are deleted. The fate of records that were
in deleted logs is not fully resolved; the disk mapping process
did not identify a single record remaining after log files were
deleted, which suggests secure deletion.
Other disk areas provided recoverable records; the experi-
ment reported above found records in the pagefile and in System
Volume Information. As would be expected, it proved possible
to influence the extent that records were saved to pagefile by
varying the amount of physical memory and the background
workload of the machine. These factors can be expected to
influence the recovery of records from this area, and also the
length of time that they remain in the pagefile before being
overwritten. The records found in System Volume Information
derive from a logfile which was deleted while the InPrivate ses-
sion was active; it has not proved possible to recover this file
information using the VSS service (i.e. as a shadow copy), so
the function of these records is unknown.
7. Conclusion
This paper reports research into the extent that a user’s InPri-
vate browsing history in Internet Explorer 10 can be recovered,
and if such records can be reliably identified as resulting from
InPrivate browsing.
None of the records recovered during these experiments could
be read using the standard database application interface, the
experimental work relied on a carving tool (ESECarve) to find
records within a disk image, after which they were manually
mapped to the file system presented by a standard forensic tool.
In about 40% of the experiments depowering the computer dur-
ing the browsing session resulted in an unrecoverable database,
due to missing log files.
The results indicate that InPrivate browsing records can be
reliably identified. Browsing records may be recovered in large
quantities depending on seizure timing: if the machine is de-
powered during an InPrivate browsing sessions records may re-
main in the database file (WebCacheV01.dat) if Internet Ex-
plorer has not been used since such a session then there are
likely to be records in database log files, otherwise it is neces-
sary to carve records from the disk. Experimentally, all three
areas held a high proportion of the user’s browsing session, and
even after log file records became inaccessible over 80% of the
browsing record remained in other disk areas.
This work has extended and clarified informal results of other
researchers, some of whom found considerable historical records
and some of whom found little. It demonstrates that longitudi-
nal studies over a series of machine and application cycles pro-
vide more information about the remanence of forensic artifacts
than one-off usage experiments, as does the explicit considera-
tion of background machine load during forensic experiments.
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Appendix A. Database File Recovery using esentutl
This section describes database recovery via the esentutl util-
ity. Although no InPrivate browsing records could be recovered
via the database application interface the process of database
recovery may be needed for some forensic tools, and the knowl-
edge of how to use esentutl allows the investigation of new
types of ESE database.
In most practical cases the database file (WebCacheV01.dat)
will be in a ‘dirty shutdown’ state; in other words not all the
current pages from memory will have been flushed to disk, and
it will first need to be brought to a consistent state if it is to be
interrogated via the database API.
Appendix A.1. Required files
The Internet Explorer 10 database is normally located at:
\Users\%USERPROFILE%\AppData\Local\Microsoft
\Windows\WebCache
The files that must be retrieved from the image are:
• The database file (WebCacheV01.dat).
• Any log files (V01.log and V01nnnnn.log - where nnnnn is
a hexadecimal sequence number).
• The checkpoint file (V01.chk).
V01.log is the file that is currently being written with log
records. The esentutl utility (see below) may reference this file
by the next number in the ascending series of hexadecimal log
numbers. This is the number it will be assigned when full, at
which time a new V01.log will be started.
Appendix A.2. Recovering the database file
This requires the Microsoft esentutl utility, which is a stan-
dard component of Windows, and is run from the command
line. The correct version of esentutl must be used; in other
words the recovery is best carried out using the version of Win-
dows from which the database was obtained. The first stage is
to check if the database file needs to be updated, and if so that
the required log files are present:
esentutl -mh <path to database file>
This provides a metadata dump from the database, of which
two lines are of particular significance:
State: Dirty Shutdown
Log Required: 192-195 (0xc1-0xc3)
If the state is given as ‘Clean Shutdown’ no pre-processing is
required; usually it is ‘Dirty Shutdown’, meaning that the Web-
CacheV01.dat file must be brought to a consistent state before
it can be read via an API.
The hexadecimal numbers of the required logs specify the
names of the required log files: V01000C1.log, V01000C2.log,
together with V01.log in this example. (Note the com-
ment above: V01.log is the most recent log, in this case
V01000C3.log.)
The esentutl recovery process is then used to bring the database
to a consistent state. Assuming that esentutl is run from a direc-
tory containing WebCacheV01.dat, the necessary log files, and
the checksum, then the command line is:
esentutl -r V01 -d
Assuming that esentutl reports success, the WebCacheV01.dat
file may now be accessed via the database API. If the database
is unknown it is often useful to begin by obtaining a list of table
names, using:
esentutl -mm <path to database file>
Appendix B. Record Carving using ESECarve
ESECarve is a recovery tool which is capable of reading
clean databases via their application interface, or reliably carv-
ing database records. A description of the carving process and
its reliability is given in (Chivers and Hargreaves, 2011); the
tool is available from the author for forensic investigation, edu-
cation or research.
In order to run the carving tool it is necessary to provide a tar-
get schema; this is built by the tool automatically from a sam-
ple clean database: a file named Reference.edb is placed in the
working directory. This file should be from the same version of
windows as the investigation target.
The tool is invoked on the command line with:
ESECarve –IE10 -r <working-directory> <target-file>
The result is a file CarvedData.csv which can be opened in a
spreadsheet. The program also places a log file ESECarveLog.txt
which records the processing together with MD5 hashes for in-
put and output files. The fields in the output file are identical
to those that would be recovered via the database application
interface, with the addition of an offset field which records the
address from which the record was carved
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